Modal structuralism promises an interpretation of set theory that avoids commitment to abstracta. This article investigates its underlying assumptions. In the first part, I start by highlighting some shortcomings of the standard axiomatisation of modal structuralism, and propose a new axiomatisation I call MSST (for Modal Structural Set Theory). The main theorem is that MSST interprets exactly Zermelo set theory plus the claim that every set is in some inaccessible rank of the cumulative hierarchy. In the second part of the article, I look at the prospects for supplementing MSST with a modal structural reflection principle, as suggested in Hellman (2015). I show that Hellman's principle is inconsistent (Theorem 5.32), and argue that modal structural reflection principles in general are either incompatible with modal structuralism or extremely weak. §1. Introduction. What counts as evidence for a mathematical statement? This is a central question in the philosophy of mathematics. On some accounts, it looks like nothing could count as enough evidence to justify the statements of accepted mathematics. After all, those statements appear to be about abstract objects, disconnected from us in space and time. 1 A common response to this problem is to deny that mathematics is about abstracta after all. Modal structuralism-the view that mathematics is about logically possible structures-is one of the leading examples of this response. 2 In set theory, a structure is a pair of sets: one set as its domain together with another set of ordered pairs as its relation. This is not the notion employed by the modal structuralist, however, since sets are abstract objects. Rather, they use the resources of plural quantification and mereology to define a similar notion without appeal to abstracta. The thought is that a structure can consist of some things as its domain together with some mereological fusions that behave suitably like ordered pairs as its relation. 3 Moreover, it is natural to think that neither pluralities nor fusions incur ontological commitments over and above the things they are pluralities and fusions of. 4 If that is right, then structures constituted by
nonabstract objects will also be nonabstract. The core idea of modal structuralism is that this is indeed right and that mathematics is about logically possible structures constituted by nonabstract objects.
To support this, the modal structuralist provides a systematic translation of mathematical statements, which appear to be about abstracta, as statements merely about possible structures. For example, the claim that there is a non-self-membered set is translated as the claim that there could have been a structure containing an object x in its domain such that the mereological fusion coding the ordered pair x, x is not contained in its relation. To ensure that the statements of accepted mathematics come out true under the translation, the modal structuralist restricts their attention to a particular class of structures: namely, those satisfying the axioms of second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC2). 5 Avoiding abstracta may be necessary to solve the epistemological problem we started with, but it is not sufficient. That problem also arises for the modal structural translations: it is not obvious that possible ZFC2 structures are more epistemically tractable than the abstract objects they are used to avoid. 6 As a first step to assessing the evidence for the translations of accepted mathematics, we have to get clear on the assumptions needed to prove them. That will be the primary goal of this article.
Here's the plan. In §2, I start by outlining the standard axioms of modal structuralism. I show that they fail to interpret even the logical axioms of set theory (Theorem 5.40) , and propose a new axiomatisation I call MSST (for Modal Structural Set Theory). I show that MSST exactly interprets Zermelo set theory plus the claim that every set is in some inaccessible rank of the cumulative hierarchy the main theorem. An immediate upshot is that MSST fails to interpret the axiom schema of Collection of ZFC (Lemma 5.13). In §3, I look at the prospects for supplementing MSST with a modal structural reflection principle, as suggested in Hellman (2015) . I show that Hellman's principle is inconsistent (Theorem 5.32) , and argue that modal structural reflection principles in general are either incompatible with modal structuralism or extremely weak. §5 is a technical appendix. §2. Axiomatising modal structuralism.
The language.
The modal structuralist wants to interpret set theory using logically possible structures satisfying the axioms of ZFC2, where a structure is a pair of pluralities: some things as a domain together with some mereological fusions that behave suitably like ordered pairs as a relation. Their language will thus have to contain a modal operator, 3, expressing logical possibility, the usual resources of first-order logic, and suitable plural and mereological resources. In this article, I will use capital letters X, Y, Z . . . etc to range over pluralities; x ∈ X to express that x is among the X s; and first-order terms x, y for the ordered pair of x and y. 7 I will also take the claim that pluralities X and Y are identical, X = Y , to be well-formed. Let L 3 denote this language. 17 When ϕ is a sentence, I will let ϕ pt denote ϕ pt ∅ and call it the ms-translation of ϕ (where ∅ is the empty plurality). 18 2.4. The standard theory. Given the language of modal structuralism, its theory will have to consist of four components: a modal logic, general axioms governing pluralities and ordered pairs, and specific axioms governing ZFC2 structures. I will now outline the standard articulation of these components. 19 2.4.1. Logic. The logic of modal structuralism is a positive free version of S5 modal logic. This is just the modal logic sound and complete for Kripke models with variable domains and a universal accessibility relation. 20
Pluralities.
The general axioms governing pluralities are the instances of a comprehension schema which says that every condition determines a plurality. Formally:
∃X ∀x(x ∈ X ↔ ϕ),
where ϕ ∈ L 3 and X is not free in ϕ. 21
Pairs.
There are two general axioms governing ordered pairs. The first is a defining axiom: it says that ordered pairs x, y and x , y are equal just in case x = x second-order Zermelo set theory replacing those satisfying ZFC2. See §2.8.4 for a discussion of the use of structures that don't satisfy ZFC2. 17 It is helpful to contrast this with the modal structural translation schema used for arithmetic. In ZFC, a structure satisfies the axioms of second-order arithmetic (PA2) just in case it is isomorphic to the natural numbers. So, any PA2 structure contains isomorphic copies of all and only the natural numbers. This means that instead of talking about the natural numbers directly, we can talk about their isomorphic copies in any or all PA2 structures. For this reason, a simpler translation schema is used: namely, ϕ tr = 2∀Y (Y P A2 → Y ϕ). In principle, this kind of translation is available for set theory. In ZFC2, there are structures isomorphic to the sets: trivially, the sets together with their membership relation is such a structure. Moreover, Zermelo's (1930) results extend to show that in ZFC2, a structure satisfies ZFC2 just in case it is either isomorphic to the sets or to some V α , for α inaccessible. This can then be used to provide a characterisation of the structures isomorphic to the sets: they are exactly the ZFC2 structures that cannot be endextended by other ZFC2 structures. Call these maximal ZFC2 structures. The modal structuralist could thus translate claims about the sets as claims about what is true in any or all possible maximal ZFC2 structures. However, as we will see in §2.4.4, they have good reason to deny that there could have been maximal ZFC2 structures. 18 The axioms below guarantee that an empty plurality necessarily exists, and that there is at most one possible empty plurality. More precisely, comp implies 2∃X ∀x(x ∈ X ), and PL1 and PL2 imply that 2∀X (∀x(x ∈ X ) → 2∀Y (∀x(x ∈ Y ) → X = Y )). It is therefore legitimate, given those axioms, to definitionally expand L 3 with ∅. 19 They can be found in Hellman (1989) and Hellman (2005) . 20 See §5.2.1 for an explicit version of the logic, and §2.8.2 for why the modal structuralist needs a free logic. See Hughes & Cresswell (1996) Chapter 16 for the soundness and completeness results. 21 For simplicity, I will use "comp" to denote this comprehension schema in various languages. It will be clear from context which is intended.
and y = y . The second is an existence axiom: it says that the pair of x and y exists whenever x and y exist. 22 Formally:
∀x, x , y, y ( x, y = x , y ↔ (x = x ) ∧ (y = y )) (P1) ∀x, y E x, y .
Arguably, these axioms are false when 3 expresses logical possibility. After all, P1 and P2 jointly imply that there are infinitely many objects if there are at least two, 23 and it seems logically possible that there be exactly three objects. Nonetheless, they are harmless. The modal structuralist can simply restrict their attention to worlds where P1 and P2 hold: without loss, they can read claims of the form 3ϕ as 3(P1 ∧ P2 ∧ ϕ). On this reading, P1 and P2 become necessary, and it is straightforward to check that the rest of the theory remains as plausible as it was on the original reading.
Structures.
There are two axioms governing the existence and behaviour of ZFC2 structures. The first says that there could have been at least one ZFC2 structure. Formally:
It is easy to see that E is equivalent to the ms-translation of the claim that there is at least one set: formally, 3∃M∃x ∈ M(x = x). So, E is non-negotiable.
The second axiom embodies the modal structuralist's response to paradox. Briefly, we can see the set-theoretic paradoxes as arising from a tension between two plausible claims: namely, that any condition determines a plurality and that any plurality determines a set. In other words, it can be seen as a tension between comp and:
where x ≡ X abbreviates ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ y ∈ X ). 24 As usual, by considering a plurality of all and only the non-self-membered sets, we are quickly led to a contradiction. The modal structuralist proposes to resolve this tension by first observing that comp in L 3 is consistent with a natural modal structural analogue of collapse: namely, that any subplurality of any possible ZFC2 structure could have determined a set in some end-extension. Formally:
THE EXTENDABILITY PRINCIPLE (EP).
They then claim that our reasons for accepting collapse are at most reasons for accepting EP. 25, 26 Say that a formula ϕ is a closure of ψ if it is the result of prefixing ϕ with a string of universal quantifiers and necessity operators in any order. Over the modal logic, let the standard theory consist of comp, P1, P2, E, and EP together with their closures.
The new theory.
2.5.1. Invariance. The standard theory faces an immediate problem: its plurality and pairing axioms tell us how pluralities and pairs behave within worlds, but ms-translations concern their behaviour across worlds. In particular, the ms-translations of simple theorems of ZFC require that pluralities and pairs are invariant between worlds: that pluralities cannot change the things they comprise, and that pairs cannot change the things they pair. For example, consider the ms-translation of the claim that there is an empty set (formally, ∃x∀y(y ∈ x)):
Now, suppose pluralities can comprise different things in different worlds. Then, M may fail to contain a pair y, x in some world, but contain it in another: so, x could go from being empty in M in some world to being nonempty in M in another, leading to failures of (1). Similarly, if pairs can change the things they pair. Is this kind of invariance plausible? For pluralities, it seems to be implied by a natural conception according to which a plurality is nothing over and above the things it comprises. To see this, consider the following formalisation of that conception. It has three principles. The first says that pluralities are sufficient for the things they comprise: that pluralities cannot exist without them, and without continuing to comprise them. Formally:
The second says that pluralities are necessary for the things they comprise: that individual things cannot co-exist without a plurality of them. Formally, this gives us the comprehension schema comp. Finally, there is an extensionality principle: it says that pluralities comprising the same things are identical. Formally: 25 Once the ms-translation schema is extended to the language of second-order set theory in §2.8.3, EP will be equivalent to the ms-translation of collapse, and the inconsistency of collapse and comp will be preserved under ms-translation. So, they will have to reject the ms-translation of some instance of comp, and consequently claim that our reasons for accepting comp do not extend to those ms-translations. This seems plausible if comp is motivated as I suggest in the next section. 26 EP has an alternative formulation in Hellman (1989) : it says that any ZFC2 structure M has a proper end-extension M , which is to say M M and dom(M ) ⊆ dom(M). Over the other axioms of the theory to be proposed below, these two formulations are equivalent. Proof: If we let X = dom(M), then the M in EP will have to be a proper end-extension of M. Now, suppose that M is a proper end-extension of M. In ZFC2 we can show that any transitive X satisfying ZFC2 either contains all sets or all and only the sets in some V α . (This is a simple generalisation of Theorem 6 in Uzquiano (1999) . See also (Drake, 1974, p. 112) .) Since M M , dom(M) will be transitive in M and thus contain all and only the sets in some V α in M , because dom(M ) ⊆ dom(M). Thus, all of M's subpluralities will form sets in V α+1 in M . 2 This alternative formulation was first proposed in Zermelo (1996) , and independently in Putnam (1967) .
It is often claimed that mereological fusions are also nothing over and above the things they fuse. But it is unclear whether this supports the relevant kind of invariance. At a minimum, we seem to need a principle which says that if the pair x, y is among the X s, then it is logically impossible that X exists without x, y being among the X s. Formally:
This essentially requires that the mereological fusions playing the role of ordered pairs cannot logically change their parts. But parthood does not appear to be a logical relation. 28 Let me briefly discuss one way around this problem. Suppose we enrich the language of modal structuralism with the resources to crossreference worlds: to say of things in one world what they are like in another. 29 Then, we could say of a plurality in one world that it contains the same pairs as it does in another, and thus of a structure in one world that it has the same structure it has in another. The ms-translation schema could be modified accordingly. For example, we could translate the claim that every set is contained in another set along the lines of: for any M in any world w, and any x ∈ M, there is some M M in a world w where M has the same structure as it does in w, and M contains a y for which x, y ∈ M . Using such a translation, P3 could be dropped.
Nonetheless, I will work with P3 as it allows for a simpler overall theory. The results I prove can then be adapted to more complicated theories and translations schemas.
How much set theory do these new axioms allow us to interpret? It turns out not very much at all. In fact, the standard theory together with PL1, PL2, and P3 fails to interpret even the logical axioms of ZFC. In particular, it fails to prove ms-translation of the logical axiom for vacuous quantification (Theorem 5.40):
where ϕ ∈ L ∈ with free variables among x − {y}. 2.5.2. Stability. What went wrong? The problem is that different structures can have radically different kinds of end-extensions, and thus have access to radically different kinds of sets. For example, it is consistent with the theory considered so far that some M only has end-extensions containing finitely many inaccessible cardinals whereas another structure M has end-extensions containing infinitely many. From the perspective of M, it will look like there are only finitely many inaccessible cardinals; whereas, from the perspective of M , it will look like there are infinitely many. 30 This is precisely what the ms-translation of L3 rules out: it says that the same kinds of sets are accessible from all structures. In particular, it implies that if (∃xϕ) pt M for some M, 27 See Uzquiano (2011) and Linnebo (2013) for further discussion of the interaction between plural and modal logic, and see §5.2.2 for a discussion of this particular formulation of the extensionality principle. 28 See Uzquiano (2014) , Sid, and the articles in Cotnoir & Baxter (2014) for discussion. 29 See, for example, Pettigrew (2012) . He uses a new pair of modal operators to express the claim that the physical part of a world w has the same structure as the physical part of some other world w . 30 
STABILITY (S).
[
where ϕ ∈ L 2 ∈ 's free variables are among x − {y}. 2.5.3. Summary. The ms-translations of basic theorems impose significant constraints on the uniformity of modal space beyond the standard theory: they require that pluralities and pairs are invariant between worlds, and that ms-translations are stable between structures. But, as I will now show, imposing those constraints suffices to interpret a significant fragment of ZFC plus a large cardinal hypothesis. It follows immediately from the main theorem that MSST proves the ms-translations of all the axioms of ZFC other than instances of the axiom schema of Collection. Standardly, those instances are classified according to their syntactic complexity: the more alternations of quantifiers, the more complex. It turns out that although Z * + In proves all instances of Collection at the lowest level of complexity, it fails to prove all instances at the very next level (Claim 3 and Lemma 5.13). In the jargon, it proves all 0 instances, but not all 1 instances. 33 So, by the main theorem, MSST proves the ms-translations of all 0 instances of Collection, but not the ms-translations of all 1 instances. 2.7. Discussion. I will now look at some questions and issues raised by the main theorem.
2.7.1. Deriving S. Can we derive S from more obvious principles? In ZFC, the analogue of S holds because any two structures co-exist: when M contains an isomorphic copy of some set, we can use it to construct an end-extension of M also containing such a copy. 34 So, in ZFC, the same kinds of sets are accessible from all structures. But this can fail in the modal setting: it may not be possible for M to co-exist with enough objects to construct the relevant kind of end-extension. So, perhaps the modal structuralist should require that any two possible structures can co-exist. Formally:
Indeed, s-compossible seems plausible for logical possibility: there appears to be nothing logical stopping any two structures co-existing. However, s-compossible sets a dangerous precedent for the modal structuralist. If logical possibility is permissive enough that any two possible structures can co-exist, it seems as though it should be permissive enough that all possible objects can co-exist. Formally:
Although u-compossible is consistent with MSST (Theorem 5.42), it is inconsistent with a natural generalisation of EP that I will argue in the next section the modal structuralist should adopt. They should thus reject u-compossible, and with it s-compossible.
Hellman suggests an alternative to s-compossible in the case of arithmetic. 36 The idea is that even though it may not be possible for two structures M and M to co-exist, structures satisfying the same sentences can. Formally:
where ϕ, ψ ∈ L 2 ∈ are sentences. Unfortunately, AP fails to prove S over the other axioms of MSST (Theorem 5.40). 37, 38 2.7.2. Paradox. Above, I took the set-theoretic paradoxes to arise from a tension between comp and collapse. The modal structuralist proposed to resolve this tension by replacing collapse with EP, which says that any subplurality of a possible structure determines a set in some possible end-extension. There are, however, other natural analogues of collapse in the modal structural setting. In particular, there is the principle which says that any possible plurality whatsoever forms a set in some structure. Formally:
(EP * ) 35 It is routine to extend the proof of the analogue of S in ZFC to show that MSST -S + s-compossible proves S. 36 See (Hellman, 1989, p. 43) and (Hellman, 1996, p. 106) . 37 Underlying the accumulation principle is a more general principle which says that isomorphic copies of M and M can co-exist. Formally:
where ∃i : M ≈ M formalises the claim that there is a plurality of ordered pairs coding an isomorphism between M and M . This principle also fails to prove S over the other axioms of MSST (see the remarks after Theorem 5.40). Thanks to Øystein Linnebo and Leon Horsten for suggesting this way of handling isomorphisms between structures that cannot co-exist. 38 Hellman's justification for the accumulation principle is that "anything internal to a given structure cannot conflict with anything internal to another" (Hellman, 1996, p. 106) , and that it is internal to a structure which sentences it satisfies. The problem is that ms-translation is not internal to a structure: it concerns not merely the structure itself, but also its end-extensions. We might say that satisfaction is a local property of structures, whereas ms-translation is a global property. It is precisely because ms-translation is a global property of structures that S is such a substantial assumption. Since the usual reasons for thinking that pluralities should determine sets are not sensitive to whether they are subpluralities of structures or not, 39 the modal structuralist should also adopt EP * . EP * implies EP over the other axioms of MSST, and goes beyond it in at least one crucial way: 40 it is inconsistent with u-compossible. This forces the modal structuralist to adopt a free logic, since u-compossible is derivable in MSST over classical logic. 41, 42, 43 Since EP is easier to work with and since it will not affect the main results of the article, 44 however, I will leave MSST as it is.
2.7.3. Second-order set theory. So far, I have focused on the interpretation of firstorder set theory. But set theorists frequently make use of the language of second-order set theory. For example, systematic connections have been discovered between large cardinal hypotheses by reformulating them in terms of second-order functions over the universe of sets. 45 For readability, I will refer to whatever second-order variables range over as classes.
So, what second-order set theory can the modal structuralist interpret? To answer this question, we first need to extend the ms-translation schema to its language. The most obvious way to do this is by interpreting second-order variables as ranging over subpluralities of structures. Formally: DEFINITION 2.5.
•
Unfortunately, this results in an extremely weak second-order set theory according to which classes are completely redundant. Let Z * 2 be Z * with its logical axioms extended to L 2 ∈ . The following minimal instance of comp says that at least every set determines a class.
(min-comp)
We can then take collapse to say that at most every set determines a class. Together, collapse and min-comp say that classes and sets are equivalent: any claim we can make 39 See, for example, the arguments in Hellman (2002) and Linnebo (2010) . 40 Proof sketch: Suppose E M. By EP * , M determines a set in some M . By the plurality axioms, M will exist and continue to be a ZFC2 structure. The results of Zermelo (1996) then show that M is isomorphic to a V α in M , and the plurality and pairing axioms can be used to construct an end-extension of M isomorphic to M . Since all of dom(M)'s subpluralities determine sets in V α+1 in M , they will also determine sets in such an end-extension, verifying EP. 41 Proof: E x and E X are axioms of classical logic (see §5.2.1). By comp, let X be a plurality of everything, and assume 3(E x ∧ x ∈ X ). By classical logic, E x and thus x ∈ X . Then, by classical logic and necessitation, we have 2E X, and thus 2(x ∈ X ) by PL1, contradicting our assumption. 42 If the move from EP to EP * can plausibly be blocked, then that would open the way to an interesting nonmodal structuralism. MSST and thus EP can be true in Kripke models with a single world (Theorem 5.42). So, the theory that results by deleting the modal operators in MSST is consistent. I am sometimes tempted to read Zermelo (1996) as proposing a nonmodal structuralism of this kind. 43 In some places, Hellman recognises something like the distinction between EP and EP * . See, for example, (Hellman, 2005, p. 544) , where he distinguishes "the extendability principle" from "the general extendability principle". But in other places, this is less clear. See, for example, (Hellman, 2011, p. 636) . 44 In particular, the upper and lower bound theorems are easily seen to hold when MSST is replaced with MSST + EP * . 45 See Kanamori (2003) for details, and Uzquiano (2003) for discussion.
with classes, we can make with sets. More precisely, for ϕ ∈ L 2 ∈ , let its first-orderisation, ϕ * , be the result of replacing its second-order variables with first-order variables. Then, collapse and min-comp are jointly equivalent to the schema:
∈ . 46 Finally, let MSST 2 be MSST together with the stability axiom S extended to all formulas in L 2 ∈ . Then: THEOREM 2.6. MSST 2 exactly interprets Z * 2 + collapse + min-comp via ms-translation. In other words, MSST 2 proves ϕ pt if and only if Z * 2 + collapse + min-comp proves ϕ, for sentences ϕ ∈ L 2 ∈ . 47 Can the modal structuralist interpret a stronger second-order set theory using some other extension of the ms-translation schema? One standard way to measure the strength of a second-order set theory is by the instances of comp it proves: the more instances it proves, the stronger it is. So, the question is: how many instances of comp can the modal structuralist interpret?
Given EP * , pluralities will only get us min-comp. But even if we expand the language of modal structuralism with new resources, there appear to be limits on the number of instances of comp the modal structuralist can interpret. For, whatever kind of collections the modal structuralist uses to interpret second-order variables, they must be nonabstract. The problem is that the more collections there are of certain kind, the less likely they are to be nonabstract. 48, 49 2.7.4. Using ZFC2 structures. The ms-translation schema was motivated by the fact that in ZFC + In, truth in the ZFC2 structures is equivalent to truth in the sets. But, it turns out that this holds for many other classes of structures. For example, in ZFC, truth throughout the well-founded extensional structures is equivalent to truth in the sets (see Lemma 5.29). Consequently, the main theorem extends to a similarly broad class of theories (Corollary 5.15). Let me mention one interesting example. Let Z2 be second-order 46 Proof: Given collapse and min-comp, we show by a simple induction on the complexity of ϕ that ϕ( X , y) is equivalent to ϕ * ( x, y) when ϕ's free variables are among X , y and x ≡ X . Moreover, it is easy to see that collapse * and min-comp * are the same trivial logical truth. So, collapse and min-comp follow immediately from the schema. 47 See Corollary 5.34 and the remarks following it. 48 Though see Rayo & Yablo (2001) for a dissenting voice. 49 Hellman makes the stronger point that any nonset sized collections are likely to be abstract. He says:
Ordinary mathematical abstracta seem tame compared to such extravagances [like a collection of all possible objects]; indulging them would deprive [modal structuralism] of much of its interest as a distinctive program. (Hellman, 2005, p. 554) See also (Hellman, 1989, p. 31) . The force of this point relies heavily on how we understand "collection". Using a primitive satisfaction predicate, it is straightforward to code nonset sized collections as formulas. For example, the formula "x = x" (understood a particular natural number in any or all possible ZFC2 structures) codes a collection of all possible objects: in any world, it satisfies every object and thus "contains" all possible objects (see Parsons, 1974) . Nonetheless, this strategy is limited, and only suffices to interpret a small number of instances of comp (see Fujimoto, 2012) . So, it is not the size of collections of some kind that gives us a reason to they are abstract, but rather the number of collections of that kind. This is interesting because although Z2 * is a much weaker theory than ZFC2, there is a precise sense in which Z * + Beth and Z * + In prove the same amount of ZFC. In particular, they both prove all 0 instances of Collection, but not all 1 instances (Claim 1 and Lemma 5.13). So, the main theorem and Theorem 2.7 imply that MSST ZFC2 and MSST Z2 * prove the ms-translations of the same amount of ZFC. 2.7.5. Incompleteness. The primary upshot of the main theorem is that MSST fails to interpret Collection. 53 The success of modal structuralism thus depends on whether we can find and justify principles beyond MSST that imply the ms-translations of its instances. But there are also other reasons to be interested in principles beyond MSST. First, many set theorists accept most of the so-called small large cardinal hypotheses. 54 Although the main theorem shows that MSST interprets the large cardinal hypothesis In, it also shows that it interprets no stronger hypotheses. 55 Second, even if they are not part of accepted mathematics, large cardinal hypotheses are interesting in their own right. Indeed, there are a huge number of questions independent of accepted mathematics which are settled by large cardinal hypotheses. So, it is independently interesting to see whether there are well-motivated principles beyond MSST that imply their ms-translations. 56 The rest of this article will look at the prospects for interpreting Collection and large cardinal hypotheses using reflection principles. §3. Reflection principles. Typically, reflection principles say that the universe of sets is indescribable: whatever is true in the sets is also true in some V α . 57 Formally: 50 See §5.1 for a definition of Z2. 51 In Z * , the cardinals can be defined by α = |V ω+α |. Moreover, it is easy to see that the inaccessible cardinals are exactly the regular fixed points (i.e., the uncountable α for which (Hellman, 1989, p. 78 ) is aware that E and EP fail to interpret Collection. In response, he proposes the following strengthened version of EP.
Let ϕ(x, y) be a formula "defining a function", where this is spelled out by writing out the [ms-translation] of the usual condition; further let a be any set in any full model such that, for any x in a, M β is the least full model containing the unique y such that ϕ(x, y). Then it is possible that there exists a common proper extension, M, of all such M β . (p. 79, 1989) The problem with this suggestion is that there will be many possible 'least' structures containing such a y, all isomorphic to one another, and no way to choose between them. 54 See, for example, Maddy's contribution to Feferman, Friedman, Maddy, & Steel (2000) . 55 In particular, it is straightforward to verify that given the least upper bound κ ω of the first ω inaccessible cardinals, V κ ω models Z * + In. But, ZFC + In proves that κ ω and thus V κ ω exist. 56 See Gödel (1964) for a classic statement of this project in the non-modal-structural setting, and Koellner (2006) for an illuminating discussion in light of recent developments in set theory. 57 See Koellner (2009) and the references therein.
where ϕ V α formalises the claim that ϕ is true in V α . We can obtain specific principles from R by specifying (i) a class of formulas for which it is to hold, and (ii) what it means for formulas in that class to be true in a V α (that is, what ϕ V α means). For formulas in the language of first-order set theory, ϕ V α is usually taken to be the result of re-interpreting its quantifiers as ranging over V α : that is, of replacing occurrences of ∃x in ϕ with ∃x ∈ V α . Let R 1 denote this restriction of R. For formulas in the language of second-order set theory, it is usually taken to be the result of re-interpreting its first-order quantifiers as ranging over V α and re-interpreting its second-order variables as ranging over subsets of V α : that is, of replacing occurrences of ∃x in ϕ with ∃x ∈ V α , ∃X ψ(X ) with ∃x ⊆ V α ψ(x), and free variables X with X ∩ V α . Let R 2 denote this restriction of R. 58 Many find reflection principles like R 1 and R 2 compelling. Indeed, many take them to "follow from" the iterative conception of set that underlies the axioms of ZFC. 59 According to this conception, the sets occur in an unending series of stages: at each stage, there are sets of any sets occurring at some previous stage. 60 The thought is that it is part of the unending nature of the stages that whenever some claim is true, they extend far enough to make it true in some stage. Since each stage is co-extensive with a V α , that gives us R.
Although R 1 is relatively weak, 61 R 2 is quite strong. Over Z2, it implies all instances of Collection and the existence of arbitrarily large inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, and 1 n -indescribable cardinals. 62 Moreover, recently proposed reflection principles that generalise R 2 go much further. For example, the principle R S in Roberts (2017) also implies the existence of arbitrarily large Ramsey, Measurable, Woodin, and 1-extendible cardinals. 63 It is therefore natural to ask whether there are modal structural versions of R 2 that are similarly strong and well-motivated.
Modal structural reflection principles.
The most obvious version of R 2 in the modal structural setting is its ms-translation. However, this turns out to be inconsistent when we use the extension of the ms-translation schema from §2.7.3, where second-order variables are interpreted as ranging over subpluralities of structures. As I mentioned, that makes the ms-translation of collapse true (Theorem 2.6). But R 2 implies comp, 64 and thus its ms-translation will imply the ms-translation of comp. Moreover, as I pointed out, it is unclear in general whether the modal structuralist can interpret comp on any extension of the ms-translation schema whilst avoiding abstracta. So, they need a less obvious version of R 2 .
3.1.1. MSR. Hellman (2015) motivates an alternative version of R 2 .
The mathematical possibilities of ever larger structures are so vast as to be "indescribable": whatever condition we attempt to lay down to characterize that vastness fails in the following sense: if indeed it is accurate regarding the possibilities of mathematical structures, it is also accurate regarding a mere segment of them, where such a segment can be taken as the domain of a single structure. (p. 271, 2015) There are two ideas here. The first is an indescribability idea: whatever is true in all possible structures is also true in a "segment" of them. I will assume for now that a segment of structures is just a suitably small collection of them, and that for ϕ to be true in all possible structures is for its ms-translation to be true. Then, we can formalise the idea as
where (ϕ pt ) X is the result of binding the structure quantifiers in ϕ pt to the segment X , and ϕ pt is defined as in §2.7.3. The second idea is that a segment of structures X "can be taken as the domain of a single structure": whatever is true in X is also true in some particular structure. Formally:
Together, S-indes and ident imply Hellman's principle:
As Hellman notes (p. 272), however, MSR is inconsistent. Just like the ms-translation of R 2 , it implies the ms-translation of comp. 65 In response, Hellman proposes a restriction of MSR "to sentences. . . that are consistent with. . . [ZFC2]" (p. 272, 2015) . There are two ways to implement this restriction, corresponding to two notions of consistency: semantic and syntactic.
If ϕ is semantically consistent with ZFC2, i.e., 3∃M(M ϕ), then:
and:
If ϕ is syntactically consistent with ZFC2, i.e., (ZFC2 ¬ϕ) pt , then:
Since it is trivially true, MSR sem cannot be what Hellman has in mind. But, it turns out that MSR syn is inconsistent (Theorem 5.32). 3.1.2. Saving MSR from inconsistency. It might be tempting at this point to look for other restrictions of MSR. But this strategy is unpromising. Any restriction should be wellmotivated, and it is unclear whether there are any well-motivated restrictions of MSR that are strong and consistent. Indeed, even if MSR syn were consistent, it would still have been entirely mysterious why MSR held for sentences syntactically consistent with ZFC2, but not for all sentences.
Once we give up on trying to find restrictions, it is easy to see that the problem with Hellman's suggestion is ident. Just as collapse is true in all possible ZFC2 structures, it can also be true in a segment of them. In fact, it will be true in any segment of structures without a greatest structure by end-extension. But, collapse is trivially false in any particular structure. So, ident is false. Nonetheless, I think S-indes suggests a crucial insight for implementing reflection in the modal structural setting. Both S-indes and R 2 are instances of a much more general indescribability idea: namely, that whatever is true in all entities of some kind, is true in a small collection of them. Call this the general reflection principle. For S-indes, the entities in question are structures; for R 2 , they are classes and sets. In contrast, neither MSR nor the ms-translation of R 2 are instances of the general reflection principle. For example, MSR says that when ϕ pt is true in all possible ZFC2 structures, then the distinct claim ϕ is true in the subpluralities and sets of some particular ZFC2 structure. 66 So, it is natural to take our question to be whether there are strong and consistent instances of the general reflection principle in the modal structural setting. To answer this question, I will start by formalising S-indes and calibrating its strength, and then move on to look at other possible instances.
3.1.3. R 3 . Formalising S-indes is just a matter of formalising the notion of a segment of structures. What constraints should we impose on such a formalisation? By analogy with the V α s used in R 2 , we might require that the segment be set-sized. Similarly, since the V α s are transitive, we might require that the segment be downward closed under structures in the sense that whenever M ∈ X and M M, then M ∈ X . The most natural way to satisfy these constraints is by taking a segment of structures to be the structures in some V α , which in turn will be in some possible structure. So, the formalisation of S-indes will say that if the ms-translation of ϕ is true in all possible ZFC2 structures, then it is true in the ZFC2 structures in some V α of some possible ZFC2 structure. For simplicity, I will further assume that V α satisfies the claim that every set is in some transitive set satisfying ZFC2 (which I'll abbreviate Trans ZFC2 ). 67 For ϕ ∈ L 3 , let ϕ * be the result of deleting ϕ's modal operators, and replacing its second-order variables with first-order variables. Then, we can state the principle more precisely as follows.
for sentences ϕ ∈ L 2 ∈ . Moreover, we can extend (1) to arbitrary formulas in L 2 ∈ by relativising it to a structure.
where ϕ ∈ L 2 ∈ 's free variables are among x, Y . Unfortunately, R 3 is extremely weak. In particular, it is equivalent to the ms-translation of R 1 (Lemma 5.35). So, the main theorem extends to show that: THEOREM 3.1. MSST + R 3 exactly interprets Z * + In + R 1 via ms-translation. In other words, MSST + R 3 proves ϕ pt if and only if Z * + In + R 1 proves ϕ. 68 It can be shown that Z * + In + R 1 proves all 1 instances of Collection, but not all 2 instances (Lemmas 5.37 and 5.38). So, Theorem 3.1 implies that MSST + R 3 only proves the ms-translations of instances of Collection of the two lowest levels of complexity. It can also be shown that Z * + In + R 1 proves the existence of the least upper bound of the first ω inaccessible cardinals, but not an inaccessible cardinal with arbitrarily large inaccessible cardinals below it. 69 3.1.4. Generalising R 3 . Are there stronger instances of the general reflection principle? There is reason to think not. In particular, there is a principle that appears to subsume all such instances, but which is no stronger than R 3 . The principle says that whatever is true, is true in some possible world structure. Formally,
where ϕ ∈ L 3 is a sentence and K is an S5 Kripke model in M. For simplicity, I will assume that K 's worlds are V α s, that plural quantifiers at a world range over its subsets, and that pairing terms are interpreted in the obvious way by set-theoretic ordered pairs. Given this assumption, it is straightforward to verify that (2) implies the corresponding instance of R 3 , because ϕ can be an ms-translation. In general, if we extend (2) to arbitrary formulas as we did with R 3 , then that extension will imply all instances of R 3 . Moreover, it is straightforward to modify the proof of Theorem 5.30 to show that this extension of (2) is interpretable in Z * + In + R 1 . It follows that its addition to MSST would exactly interpret Z * + In + R 1 , just like MSST + R 3 . 3.1.5. Summary. Given the failure of Hellman's MSR syn , I suggested that the prospects for reflection principles in the modal structural setting turn on whether there are strong and consistent instances of the general reflection principle. I then argued that there are not: that instances of the general reflection principle in L 3 are extremely weak. In particular, that they fail to interpret Collection. §4. Conclusion. Modal structuralism promises an epistemology of mathematics. The results in this article give us reason to be cautious about its success. In the first instance, they show that the standard axioms need to be supplemented with something like the stability principle S (Theorem 5.40), whose justification is unclear. Once S is added to those axioms, a significant fragment of ZFC becomes interpretable, but many instances of the axiom schema of Collection remain out of reach (the main theorem). 70 In the second instance, they show that one of the most promising ways to justify the axiom schema of Collection and many of the small large cardinal hypotheses-namely, using reflection principles-is unavailable to the modal structuralist (Theorem 3.1 and §3.1.4). Finally, they show that the translations of second-order set theories involving a large number of instances of the comprehension schema comp may simply be incompatible with modal structuralism (Theorem 2.6 and §2.7.3). Although there is little consensus among set theorists concerning second-order set theory, there is a growing interest in such theories. 71 If they become accepted, this would be a serious problem for the modal structuralist. §5. Technical appendix. This appendix contains proofs of the results mentioned in the main text. I start with an axiomatisation of MSST. I then establish some results concerning the ms-translations provable in a broad class of theories like MSST. Finally, I establish similar results for reflection principles.
Preliminaries.
The language of first-order set theory, L ∈ , has in addition to the usual resources of first-order logic, the nonlogical membership relation ∈. It takes x ∈ y 69 It is straightforward to verify that if κ is such a cardinal, then V κ models ZFC + In and thus Z * + In + R 1 . 70 Moreover, these instances continue to be uninterpretable when we replace ZFC2 structures with T structures for any plausible set theory T (Lemma 5.13 and the upper bound theorem). 71 For example, by Joel Hamkins and Victoria Gitmam. and x = y to be well-formed. The language of second-order set theory, L 2 ∈ , extends L ∈ with second-order variables X, Y, Z , . . . etc. It takes x ∈ X to be well-formed, although not X = Y .
I will use the following modified Levy hierarchy to measure the complexity of formulas in L ∈ . If ϕ's quantifiers are all of the form ∃x ∈ y, then it is 0 , 0 , and 0 . If its quantifiers are all of the form ∃x ∈ y or ∃x ⊆ y, then it is * 0 , * 0 , and * 0 . In general, if ϕ is n , formula, respectively. 72 Let ZFC be the L ∈ theory consisting of Extensionality, Infinity, Pairing, Union, Powerset, Foundation, Separation, Choice, 73 and: n formulas, respectively. Let ZFC2 denote the conjunction of the axioms of ZFC with Separation, Collection, and Foundation replaced by their second-order formulations. 74 Zermelo set theory (Z(2)) is ZFC(2) minus Collection. T * is T plus the claim that every set is in some V α .
An axiomatisation of MSST.
MSST consists of four groups of axioms: a modal logic, general axioms governing pluralities and ordered pairs, and specific axioms governing ZFC2 structures.
5.2.1. Logic. The underlying logic of MSST is a positive free S5 modal logic. More precisely, its axioms are the instances in L 3 of the truth-functional tautologies, the S5 axioms, 75 and the following quantificational and identity axioms (where x, y are either both first-or second-order variables):
, where x and y are free for z in ϕ.
The rules of inference are MP, from ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ; GEN, if ϕ is a theorem, then so is ∀xϕ; and NEC, if ϕ is a theorem, then so is 2ϕ.
REMARK 5.1. This version of S5 is sound and complete for Kripke models with variable domains and a universal accessibility relation. 76 Over the truth-functional tautologies,
72 Throughout the appendix I will claim that various notions have a certain complexity, giving a partial or full justification where necessary. Where a partial justification is given, Kunen (2011) can be used to fill it out. 73 I will take Choice to be the claim that every set has an enumeration. Formally,
. 74 The second-order formulation of Foundation is ∀X (∃x(x ∈ X ) → ∃x ∈ X ∀y ∈ X (y ∈ x)). 75 That is: K (i.e., 2(ϕ → ψ) → 2ϕ → 2ψ)-which is valid on all Kripke models-T (i.e., ϕ → 3ϕ)-which corresponds to the frame condition on Kripke models that accessibility be reflexive-and 5 (i.e., 3ϕ → 23ϕ)-which corresponds to the frame condition on Kripke models that accessibility be Euclidean (i.e., if x Ry and x Rz, then y Rz). 76 See Hughes & Cresswell (1996) Chapter 16. One useful feature of the logic is that it allows for existential instantiation within the scope of modal operators. In particular, if ψ is provable 
. 78, 79 from premises and 3(E x ∧ ϕ) (where x are not free in or ψ), then ψ is provable from and 3∃ xϕ. (Proof: Suppose ψ is provable from and 3(E x ∧ ϕ) as above. By the deduction theorem, Hughes & Cresswell (1996) , p. 62) and thus ∃ xϕ → 2( → ψ). Similarly, S5 then implies that 3∃ xϕ → ( → ψ) (see Hughes & Cresswell (1996) , p. 295). So ψ is provable from and 3∃ xϕ as required.) 77 The difference between classical and positive free logic can be ignored in many contexts. In particular, a simple induction on the length of proofs shows that ϕ is provable from premises in classical S5 using MP and GEN just in case E x → ϕ is provable from in positive free logic using MP and GEN (where ϕ's free variables are among x). So, we can reason classically as long as all the relevant parameters exist and we do not appeal to NEC. Moreover, it follows that classical and positive free logics agree on the sentences provable from any , using just MP and GEN. 78 PL3 is redundant, but added for simplicity. Proof: The idea is to show that whenever Y exists, we can use comp to get a subplurality of Y which is co-extensive with X . PL1 and PL2 can then be used to show that Z is equal to X . More precisely, assume
. So, 33(x ∈ X ) and thus 3(x ∈ X ) by S5. Since "x" is not free in our assumptions and they are of the form 3ϕ, we can conclude in S5 that:
and thus that X = Z by PL2.
and thus, by S5:
It is worth noting that PL3 does not follow from the weaker but more standard extensionality principles for pluralities, Linnebo (2017) and Uzquiano (2011) .) Proof: consider an S5 Kripke model K with two worlds w 0 , w 1 , both with the first-order domain {0, 1}. Let the pluralities at w 0 be ∅, {0}, {1}, and {0, 1} and the pluralities at w 1 be ∅, 3, {1}, and {0, 1}. At w 0 and w 1 , we let ∅ contain nothing, {1} contain 1, and {0, 1} contain 0 and 1. At w 0 , we let {0} contain 0, but at w 1 we make it contain nothing; and at w 1 , we let 3 contain 0, but at w 0 we make it contain nothing. So, K validates 2∀x(3(x ∈ {0}) ↔ 3(x ∈ 3)). It is straightforward to check that K validates comp, PL1, and the other versions of PL2. Moreover, at w 0 , both {0} and {0, 1} exist and {0} is a subplurality of {0, 1}; but, at w 1 , {0, 1} exists even though {0} does not. So, K does not validate PL3. 79 Hewitt (2012) argues that PL1 is false. As he points out, however, PL1 does hold for "rigid" pluralities. If necessary, the modal structuralist can re-interpret their second-order variables as ranging over rigid pluralities, without loss. 
Pairs.
(P1) ∀x, x , y, y ( x, y = x , y ↔ (x = x ) ∧ (y = y )) (P2) ∀x, y E x, y (P3) x, y ∈ X → 2(E X → x, y ∈ X ) (P4) x, y = x, y (P5) τ = τ → (ϕ[τ/z] ↔ ϕ[τ /z]),
Existence, Extendability, and Stability. EXISTENCE (E)
where ϕ ∈ L ∈ 's free variables are among x − {y}.
In addition these axioms, MSST has as axioms the result of prefixing any of them with a sequence of ∀'s and 2's in any order. It follows that whenever ϕ is a theorem of MSST, so are ∀xϕ and 2ϕ. 5.2.5. MSST T . MSST can be easily modified for theories other than ZFC2. Let MSST T denote the result of replacing ZFC2 structures in the MSST axioms with T structures (where T is a sentence in L 2 ∈ ). As I will show, many central results concerning MSST also hold for a much broader class of theories of the form MSST T .
The ms-translations provable in MSST T .
There are two primary results concerning the ms-translations provable in MSST T . The first sets a lower bound: it says that MSST T at least interprets a certain set theory S T via ms-translation. The second sets an upper bound: it says that for a broad class of theories T, MSST T at most interprets S T via ms-translation. Before proving these results, I will state them more precisely and draw out some of their consequences. S T is an extremely simple theory. Nonetheless, by adding various sentences to T, it can be made to prove increasingly large fragments of ZFC. Ultimately, it can be made to prove all of Z plus 0 -Col. Let's look at some examples.
It is a standard result, provable in logic alone, that 0 formulas are absolute for transitive sets, 81 and thus that 1 formulas are upward absolute for transitive sets. 82 It follows that:
Proof. Suppose ϕ is a sentence of the form ∀ xψ where ψ is 1 . By Trans T , any x are in some transitive set y satisfying T. Since ϕ is provable in T, y also satisfies ϕ and thus ψ. So, ψ is true by the upward absoluteness of 1 formulas. So, by the lower bound theorem and Claim 1, MSST proves the ms-translations of all theorems of Z minus Powerset. But this also holds for MSST T for theories T much weaker than ZFC2. In particular, it is easy to see that Pairing and Union already follow from S T . So, the lower bound theorem and Claim 1 imply that when T contains Extensionality, Foundation, Infinity, and Choice, MSST T also proves the ms-translations of all theorems of Z minus Powerset. REMARK 5.6. Given that S T proves Pairing and Union, it will prove that sequences of universal quantifiers are equivalent to single universal quantifiers: that is, for any n formula ϕ, it proves that ∀ xϕ is equivalent to ∀xψ for some n formula ψ. Similarly, for existential quantifiers. 84 Consequently, it also proves that n+1 -Col is equivalent to n -Col. 85 We can extend Claim 1 by requiring that the sets satisfying T in Trans T are supertransitive: that, in addition to being transitive, they contain any subset of any set they contain. In the presence of Extensionality and Separation, it is straightforward to show that this is equivalent to requiring that they satisfy second-order Separation in addition to being transitive. Then, just as 0 formulas are absolute for transitive sets, it is easy to see that * 0 formulas 81 We say that ϕ is absolute for x when ∀ y ∈ x(ϕ x ↔ ϕ), where ϕ's free variables are among y. 82 We say that ϕ is upward absolute for x when ∀ y ∈ x(ϕ x → ϕ), where ϕ's free variables are among y. 83 Formally, the Mostowski collapse lemma is:
. 84 See Devlin (1984) , Lemma 8.9. 85 See Devlin (1984) , Lemma 11.3, of which the mentioned result is a simple generalisation.
are absolute for supertransitive sets, and thus that * 1 formulas are upward absolute for supertransitive sets. It follows as before that: So, by the lower bound theorem and Claims 1 and 2, MSST proves the ms-translations of all theorems of Z. But again this also holds for theories T much weaker than ZFC2. It is easy to see that Powerset already follows from S T + Extensionality when T contains second-order Separation. So, the lower bound theorem and Claim 1 already imply that when T contains Extensionality, Foundation, Infinity, Choice, and second-order Separation, MSST T proves the ms-translations of all theorems of Z.
REMARK 5.8. Recall that, in Z * , an uncountable ordinal κ is a fixed point in the enumeration of the cardinals just in case κ = |V κ |, and that κ is an inaccessible cardinal just in case it is also regular. Now, in Z * , we can show that a transitive set satisfies Z2 * minus Choice just in case it is of the form V λ for λ > ω a limit ordinal. 88 It is then straightforward to verify that V λ satisfies Choice just in case λ = |V λ |, and that it satisfies Choice and Collection just in case λ = |V λ | and λ is regular. So, in Z * , the claim (Beth) that there are arbitrarily large fixed points in the enumeration has the * 2 formulation ∀x∃y(y is transitive ∧ x ∈ y ∧ (Z2 * ) y ), and the claim (In) that there are arbitrarily large inaccessible cardinals has the * 2 formulation ∀x∃y(y is transitive ∧ x ∈ y ∧ (ZFC2) y ).
86 Claims 1 and 2 are optimal: there are 2 sentences ϕ which are unprovable in S T for some T containing ϕ, Extensionality, and second-order Separation. Proof: Let T contain just Extensionality, second-order Separation, and the 2 sentence which says that there is a greatest ordinal. Working in ZFC, first note that every V n is supertransitive and contains a greatest ordinal. Since "x is an ordinal" is 0 , each V n will satisfy T. Moreover, since "x is transitive" is 0 , and "ϕ x " is * 0 , they will be absolute for the supertransitive V ω . So, V ω S T . But, V ω "there is no greatest ordinal". 87 In particular, it can be formulated as: ∀x∃y, z(y = V z ∧ x ∈ y), where "x = V y " is the * 0 (and 2 ) formula "
where "x = {P( f (β)) : β ∈ dom( f )}" is the * 0 (and 1 ) formula:
and "x = P( {P( f (β)) : β ∈ dom( f )})" is the * 0 (and 2 ) formula:
where "x = P(y)" is the * It follows from Claims 1 and 2 that S ZFC2 proves ∀x∃α(x ∈ V α ) and In. So, S ZFC2 = Z * + In. Similarly, it follows that S Z2 * proves ∀x∃α(x ∈ V α ) and Beth. So, S Z2 * = Z * + Beth.
Finally, we can extend Claim 2 by requiring that 1 formulas are absolute for the sets satisfying T in Trans T .
DEFINITION 5.9. Let T ≺ 1 V be the schema which says that 1 formulas are absolute for transitive sets satisfying T. Formally:
where ϕ is 1 with free variables among y. So, by the lower bound theorem and Claims 1 and 3, MSST proves the ms-translations of all theorems of Z + 0 -Col (because each instance of ZFC2 ≺ 1 V is provable in ZFC). 90 But this also holds for theories weaker than ZFC2. It is easy to see that all instances of 0 -Col already follow from S T + T ≺ 1 V . And there are relatively weak theories T for which S T proves T ≺ 1 V . The simplest example is Z2 * .
LEMMA 5.11. S Z2 * proves Z2 * ≺ 1 V , and thus all instances of 0 -Col.
Proof. As usual, let H κ = {x : |tc(x)| < κ}, where tc(x) is the transitive closure of x. It is a standard result in ZFC that 1 formulas are absolute for H κ when κ > ω. 91 I will reprove that result in S Z2 * = Z * and then show that when x is a transitive set satisfying Z2 * , x = H κ for some κ > ω.
Working in Z * , we can prove the Mostowski collapse lemma. To see this, suppose that D, R is a well-founded extensional structure with |D| = κ. (Recall that, on the formulation I am employing, Choice says that every set is equinumerous with an ordinal. This means κ + exists for any κ.) A simple induction shows that the range of any collapsing function from D, R -i.e., a function f for which dom( f ) = D, rng( f ) is transitive, and ∀x, y ∈ D( x, y ∈ R ↔ f (x) ∈ f (y)))-will be contained in H κ + (which exists because H α + ⊆ V α + , for any α). So, we can construct such a function by transfinite recursion using Separation on D × H κ + . Now, let x ∈ H κ for κ > ω and suppose there is some y for which ϕ( x) (where ϕ is 0 with free variables among y, x). Let V α contain y and x. Then, because ϕ is 0 , (∃yϕ( x)) V α . Let M be an elementary substructure of V α with 89 Claim 3 is optimal: there are T containing 3 sentences ϕ which are unprovable in S T + T ≺ 1 V .
Proof: Let T be ZFC2 plus the claim that there are at most finitely many transitive sets satisfying ZFC2.
) (which we can abbreviate as ). It is easy to see that is 3 , since "(ZFC2) x " is 1 . Working in ZFC plus the claim that there are ω inaccessibles, let κ n : n < ω enumerate the first ω inaccessibles and let κ ω be their least upper bound. Since the V κ s for κ inaccessible, are exactly the transitive sets satisfying ZFC2, there are precisely n many transitive sets satisfying ZFC2 in V κ n : namely, the V κ m s for m < n. Moreover, the function f enumerating these V κ m s will exist in V κ n . But "x is transitive" is 0 and "ϕ x " is * 0 . So, they will be absolute for supertransitive V α . Thus, V κ n but V κ ω ¬ . Finally, by Lemma 5.11 below, S T proves T ≺ 1 V . 90 See, for instance, (Kanamori, 2003, p. 299) . 91 This was first established by Lévy (1965) . See also (Kanamori, 2003, p. 299). tc( {x}) ⊆ M and |M| = |tc( {x}) × ω| < κ, and let i be a collapsing function from M. Then, rng(i) is transitive, of size < κ, and thus in H κ . Moreover, (∃yϕ(i( x) )) rng(i) . A simple induction shows that i is the identity on tc( {x}) ⊆ M. So, (∃yϕ( x) ) rng(i) and thus (∃yϕ( x)) H κ (because ϕ is 0 and so absolute between rng(i) and H κ ).
Recall that a transitive set satisfies Z2 * just in case it is of the form V κ for κ > ω with κ = |V κ |. It follows that κ is a limit cardinal (because it is α<κ |V α |). So,
So, by the lower bound theorem, Claims 1 and 2, and Lemma 5.11, MSST Z2 * proves the ms-translations of all theorems of Z * + Beth + 0 -Col.
Instances of 0 -Col signal an insuperable limit on the amount of Collection provable in S T . In particular, it turns out that for any T, S T either contradicts a theorem of ZFC or fails to prove all instances of 1 -Col. To show this, I need the following simple lemma.
LEMMA 5.12. Suppose that any sets are in some supertransitive set. Then, * 0 formulas have 2 formulations.
Proof. Let ϕ be * 0 with free variables among y, and assume that any sets are in some supertransitive set. Then, since * 0 formulas are absolute for supertransitive sets, ϕ is equivalent to both ∃x(x is supertransitive ∧ y ∈ x ∧ϕ x ) and ∀x((x is supertransitive ∧ y ∈ x) → ϕ x ), which are 2 and 2 , respectively (because "x is supertransitive" is 1 ).
LEMMA 5.13. If S T is consistent with Z * , then it fails to prove all instances of 1 -Col.
Proof. Let Z * T be Z * + Trans T . I will start by showing that if Z * T is consistent, then it fails to prove that there is a supertransitive set satisfying all of its axioms other than Separation. 92 Formally, ∃x(x is supertransitive ∧ (Z T − Separation) x ), which we can abbreviate as ∃x (x). I will then show that Z * T + 1 -Col does prove ∃x (x). It follows immediately from these two claims that Z * T fails to prove all instances of 1 -Col, if consistent. So, suppose Z * T proves ∃x (x). Working in Z * T , let x be a least set for which (x). Since x is supertransitive, it satisfies each instance of Separation and thus each axiom of Z * T . So, (∃y (y)) x . Now, "x is supertransitive" and "(Z * T − Separation) x " are both absolute for x, since they are * 0 and 0 , respectively. So, ∃y ∈ x (y), contradicting the minimality of x.
Since every set is in some V α , a simple induction shows that for each n there is an nlength sequence f of V α s such that both f (n) and a function enumerating f (n) are in a transitive set satisfying T in f (n+1). Formally: ∀n∃ f ( f is a function ∧dom( f ) = n+1∧:
Abbreviate this as ∀n∃ f (n, f ). Since "x = V y " and "T x " are * 0 , (n, f ) is * 0 and thus Z * 2 by Lemma 5.12 (because the V α s are supertransitive). So, because 1 -Col is equivalent to 2 -Col, it follows that there is a set containing such a function for each n. Using these functions, we can finally construct an ω-sequence of the same kind: namely, for which f (n) is a V α , and both f (n) and a function enumerating f (n) are in some transitive set satisfying T in f (n + 1). It is then straightforward to check that when f is such a sequence,
In particular, we get that V λ satisfies Choice because f (n + 1) contains a function enumerating f (n). Thus, V λ is a witness to ∃x (x). The main theorem is then immediate from this corollary and the fact that S ZFC2 = Z * + In. Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ, I will show that MSST T proves:
The
whenever ϕ ∈ L 3 is quasi-modalised with free variables among x. For x ∈ X and x, y ∈ X , this is immediate from PL1 and P3; for x = y and τ = τ , from L4 and L5, and P4 and P5. The conjunction, negation, 3, and 3∃ x cases are trivial in S5, given the induction hypothesis. For ∃y ∈ Y ϕ, suppose E x, Y, y ∧ y ∈ Y ∧ ϕ. By the induction hypothesis and P3, it follows that 2(E x, Y → E y ∧ y ∈ Y ∧ ϕ) and thus that 2(E x, Y → ∃y ∈ Y ϕ). The case for ∃Z ⊆ Y is proved similarly using P4.
So, MSST T proves that Y ϕ and ϕ pt Y are invariant, since each is quasi-modalised. Strictly speaking, Y Y is not quasi-modalised, because it involves ∃Z (Z = X ). However, it is easy to see that ∃Z (Z = X ) is equivalent to ∃Z ⊆ X (Z = X ). So, if we let E X abbreviate that formula instead, as I will from now on, Y Y becomes quasi-modalised, and thus invariant.
Using Lemma 5.20, a simple induction shows that in
and Y ⊆ M, and where ϕ ∈ L 2 ∈ with free variables among z).
In the previous section, I pointed out that 0 formulas are absolute for transitive sets. The next lemma establishes an analogue of this result for the ms-translations of bounded formulas.
LEMMA 5.21 (MSST T ). Suppose E M, x ∈ M, and X ⊆ M. Then:
∈ is bounded, with free variables among x, X. Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ. The only difficult cases are the right-to-left directions for ∃x ∈ y, ∃x ∈ Y , and ∃X ⊆ Y . For the first, suppose E M, x ∈ M, X ⊆ M,
where ϕ's free variables and y are among x, X . By PL1 and PL3, x and X exist and are elements and subpluralities of M whenever M exists. So, by the induction hypothesis:
It is easy to see that just as 0 formulas are absolute for transitive sets, bounded formulas are absolute between structures M and M when M M . 93 Thus:
Finally:
M ∃x ∈ yϕ by Lemma 5.20. The cases for ∃x ∈ Y and ∃X ⊆ Y are proved similarly.
∈ is bounded with free variables among x, X . THEOREM 5.24 (The lower bound theorem). Let ϕ ∈ L ∈ be a sentence. If S T proves ϕ, then MSST T proves ϕ pt .
3∃M
M∃z ms-translations. 5.3.4 . Proof of the upper bound theorem. I will first establish a natural interpretation of MSST T into S T + Trans Pairing + the Mostowski collapse lemma when T contains Extensionality and second-order Foundation. As I will show, the most obvious translation from L 3 to L ∈ , which takes possible worlds to be transitive sets closed under pairing, plural quantification over those sets to be first-order quantification over their subsets, and pairs x, y to be set-theoretic ordered pairs, is just such an interpretation. 
THEOREM 5.36. MSST 2 + R 3 exactly interprets Z * + In + R 1 via ms-translation.
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ L ∈ be a sentence. It is immediate from the main theorem and Lemma 5.35 that MSST 2 + R 3 proves ϕ pt whenever Z * + In + R 1 proves ϕ. Now, suppose MSST 2 + R 3 proves ϕ pt . So, for some instances ψ pt and χ pt of S 2 and R
w by Theorem 5.30 and thus (ψ * ∧ χ) → ϕ by Lemmas 5.28 and 5.29. So, Z * + In + R 1 proves ϕ, since ψ * is an instance of the logical axiom for vacuous quantification L3 and χ is an instance of R 1 .
Finally, the next two results show that Z * + In + R 1 goes beyond Z * + In in proving 1 -Col, but that it goes no further: it does not prove all instances of 2 -Col. LEMMA 5.37. Z * + In + R 1 1 -Col. Proof. Working in Z * , recall from Lemma 5.11 that 1 formulas are absolute for H κ , when κ is an uncountable cardinal. It is easy to check that H κ = V κ , when κ is inaccessible, and thus that H κ = V κ , when κ is a limit of inaccessibles. So, 1 formulas are absolute for V κ , when κ is a limit of inaccessibles. Now suppose ∀x∃yϕ(x, y, z), where ϕ is 1 with free variables among x, y, z. Applying R 1 to ∀x∃yϕ(x, y, z) ∧ E z ∧ Eu ∧ Trans ZFC2 , we get a V α which contains z and u, satisfies ∀x∃yϕ(x, y, z), and for which α is a limit of inaccessibles (because "x is transitive ∧ ZFC2
x " is * 0 and thus absolute for V α , and because the transitive sets satisfying ZFC2 are exactly the V β s, for β inaccessible). Thus, ∀x ∈ u∃y ∈ V α ϕ(x, y, z).
LEMMA 5.38. Z * + In + R 1 2 -Col.
Proof. Working in Z * + In + 2 -Col, I will build a model of Z * + In + R 1 . Let "x y" be a Z * 1 satisfaction relation (where x is a model and y a formula/finite variable assignment pair). 105 Suppose we could find a limit of inaccessibles κ such that:
Then, it would follow that V κ Z * + In + R 1 . 106 To see this, first note that the * 0 formula "x is transitive ∧ ZFC2
x " will be absolute for V κ , and so V κ S ZFC2 = Z * + In. Second, note that if ϕ( x) V κ , then ∃α(V α "ϕ", x ) and "ϕ", x ∈ V κ , and so ∃α < κ(V α "ϕ", x ). Thus, ϕ( x) V α and because "y = V z ∧ ϕ y " is * 0 and thus absolute for V κ , it follows that (ϕ( x) V α ) V κ .
I will now prove that such a κ exists in Z * + In + 2 -Col. Let (x, α) abbreviate "∃β(V β x) → (V α x)". Since "x = V y " is * 0 , it is Z * 2 by Lemma 5.12. So, since "V α x" is just "∃y(y = V α ∧ y x)", and since "x y" is Z * 1 , "V α x" is also Z * 2 . So, (x, α) is Z * 3 . Since 2 -Col is equivalent to 3 -Col in Z * , 107 and since trivially ∀x∃α (x, α), it follows in Z * + In + 2 -Col that:
Let (α, β) abbreviate "[β is inaccessible ∧ ∀x ∈ V α ∃γ < β (x, γ )]". Given (6), we can construct finite sequences of such α, β. Formally, ∀n∃ f ( f is a function ∧ dom( f ) = n + 1 ∧ f (0) = 0 ∧ ∀m < n ( f (m), f (m + 1)). Let ∀n∃ f X(n, f ) abbreviate this.
In the presence of 2 -Col, the bounded quantifiers "∀x ∈ V α " and "∃γ < β" can be absorbed into (x, α). 108 So, (α, β) is Z * 3 (because "β is inaccessible" has the Z * 2 formulation "∃y(y = V β ∧ ZFC2 y )" by Lemma 5.12). Similarly, "∀m < n" can be absorbed into (α, β). So, X(n, f ) is Z * 3 . It follows by 2 -Col that there is some x such that ∀n∃ f ∈ xX(n, f ). We can then use these functions in x to build an ω-sequence f such that X( f (n), f (n + 1)). Finally, it is straightforward to check that ∪rng( f ) is a limit of inaccessibles for which (5) holds.
Stability is unprovable in MSST -S.
The next result shows that S is unprovable in MSST-S, even when it is supplemented with Hellman's accumulation principle.
DEFINITION 5.39. Let AP denote:
where ϕ, ψ ∈ L 2 ∈ are sentences. THEOREM 5.40 (ZFC + In). MSST -S + AP does not prove S.
Proof. Let κ 0 = 0, κ α+1 be the least inaccessible greater than κ α , and κ λ = α<λ κ α . Consider a Kripke model K with set of worlds W = { α, n : (α < ω ∧ n = 0) ∨ (α < ω2 ∧ n = 1)}, where the first-order domain at α, n is { x, n : x ∈ V κ α } and the secondorder domain is P({ x, n : x ∈ V κ α }). Any worlds w, w access each other. So we have two kinds of worlds. The 0-worlds are just 0-tagged copies of the first ω inaccessible ranks and the 1-worlds are just 1-tagged copies of the first ω2 inaccessible ranks. Thus, the 0-worlds and 1-worlds are completely disjoint. We interpret the pairing operator so that " x, m , y, n " denotes x, y , m if m = n and otherwise 0 (since 0 is not in any of the domains). In other words, the pair of x, y behaves as expected when x, y can co-exist and is otherwise a dummy object. It is straightforward but tedious to verify that MSST -S is valid in K . I will now show that the following instance of S is false at some world in K .
(∃α(Trans
It is easy to check that V α satisfies "∃β(Trans ZFC2 ) V β " just in case α > κ ω (because "x is transitive ∧ZFC2 x " and "x = V y " are * 0 , and thus absolute for any V β , and the V γ s, for γ inaccessible, are precisely the transitive sets satisfying ZFC2). Let M be a ZFC2 structure in some 1-world w, where M is isomorphic to V κ ω+1 . So, V κ ω+1 ∃β(Trans ZFC2 ) V β , and thus w M ∃β(Trans ZFC2 ) V β . Since MSST-S is valid in the model, and since the proof of Lemma 5.21 and its extension to * 0 formulas does not use S, it follows that w (∃β(Trans ZFC2 ) V β ) pt (because "x = V y ∧ (Trans ZFC2 ) x " is * 0 ). Now, for contradiction, suppose that the consequent of (7) is true at w. Let M be any ZFC2 structure contained in any 0-world. It will follow that for some world w , w ∃M M∃β ∈ 
where ∃i : M ≈ M formalises the claim that there is a plurality of ordered pairs coding an isomorphism between M and M . It is straightforward to modify the construction above to make MSST -S + (*) valid, but S fail. The idea is to take half of the things in the 0-worlds and add them to the 1-worlds. Then, any 0-world structure will be isomorphic to a 0-world structure which is also a 1-world structure. That will verify (*). We can then run the argument above, picking the 0-world structure M so that it is disjoint from all the 1-worlds.
5.5.
MSST is satisfiable in a single world. The final result of this article shows that MSST is satisfiable in a Kripke model with a single world. Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 5.40, let κ ω be the least upper bound of the first ω inaccessibles. Let K be a Kripke model with set of worlds W = {0}. The first-order domain at 0 is just V κ ω and the second-order domain is P(V κ ω ). We interpret x, y as the set-theoretic pair of x and y. It is straightforward but tedious to verify that MSST -E -EP -S is valid in K . Now, suppose that M ⊆ V κ ω and 0 M ZFC2. Then, by absoluteness, M really is a ZFC2 structure. So, for some inaccessible κ, |V κ | = |M| ≤ |V κ ω |. Thus, κ = κ n . Using this fact, we can show by induction that:
where j is an isomorphism between M and V κ n , and where ϕ ∈ L 2 ∈ with free variables among x, Y . 109 Now, it is easy to see that V κ ω satisfies S ZFC2 = S + ZFC2 . Thus, by Lemma 5.29:
(0 ϕ pt ) ↔ V κ ω ϕ * for sentences ϕ ∈ L 2 ∈ . Now, EP is equivalent to collapse pt in MSST -E -EP -S, 110 and that E is equivalent to (∃x(x = x)) pt . We also know that collapse * and ϕ * are trivial 109 The only difficult cases are those for the quantifiers. 
